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EXPLORING THE RATIONALE FOR THE CHARITABLE 
CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION
Yoram MARGALIOTH*
Resumen
En este trabajo se analizan las posibles justificaciones de la charitable contribution 
deduction y se sostiene que, a pesar de su nombre, ésta desempeña un rol eficiente. Es posi-
ble asimismo que mejore la democracia, empujando a la mayoría a gastar una parte de la 
recaudación fiscal en bienes públicos que satisfacen las preferencias de las minorías. Sin 
embargo, liberando una parte de la recaudación que de otra forma se hubiera requerido 
para financiar algunos bienes públicos, incrementa el bienestar social al reducir las distor-
siones introducidas por los impuestos, o al permitir, al mismo nivel de carga tributaria, una 
provisión adicional de bienes público o transferencias del Estado de bienestar. Los bienes 
públicos son equivalentes a las transferencias universales en especie. Por tanto, si bien la 
charitable contribution deduction tiene efectos regresivos en el conjunto del sistema tribu-
tario estadounidense, y las entidades que contribuye a financiar tienen un efecto neutro 
sobre la desigualdad, la deducción puede tener un efecto redistributivo positivo total.
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Abstract
In this paper, I have examined the possible justifications for the charitable contribution 
deduction and found that, in spite of its name, it serves an efficiency role. It may also 
enhance democracy, by forcing the majority to spend some tax revenue on public goods that 
satisfy minorities’ preferences. However, by freeing up some tax revenue that would have 
been otherwise required to finance some public goods, it increases social well-being by 
reducing distortive taxes, or by allowing, at the same level of taxes, additional provision of 
public goods or transfer (welfare) payments. Public goods are equivalent to universal 
transfer payments in-kind. Hence, even though the charitable contribution deduction has a 
regressive effect on the tax structure, and the tax-exempt entities it finances have a neutral 
effect on inequality, the deduction may have an overall positive redistributive effect.
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I. INTRODUCTION
SECTION 170 of the US Internal Revenue Code, known as the «charitable contri-bution deduction,» allows taxpayers to deduct, from their adjusted gross income 
(AGI), voluntary transfers of cash or property made to organizations formed for 
religious, educational, medical, scientific and other charitable purposes  (1).
The regulations define the term «charitable» as «in its generally accepted legal 
sense, not to be construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)
(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of char-
ity as developed by judicial decisions»  (2).
The term includes «relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivi-
leged» and a long list of other purposes, some of them related to socio-economic 
issues such as «community deterioration and juvenile delinquency.» However, 
inequality in general and income or wealth inequality in particular, are not explic-
itly stated  (3).
Indeed, the term «charitable» may somewhat overstate the connection between 
the deduction and promotion of distributive justice, for the following reasons.
Gifts made to individuals, even when clearly justified on distributive justice 
grounds, cannot be deducted under section 170. Moreover, organizations whose 
donors benefit from section 170 are not required to engage in income redistribu-
tion  (4). Hospitals, for example, are not required to offer their services for free or at 
reduced rates to low-income patients in order that their donors qualify under the 
section  (5).
  (1) See I.R.C. § 170 (2013).
  (2) See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1 (2014). 
  (3) Id.
  (4) See Colombo, J. D., «The Role of Access in Charitable Tax Exemption», Washington Uni-
versity Law Review, Vol. 82, No. 2, 2004, pp. 343-343.
  (5) See Perry Fleischer, M., «Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distri-
butive Justice», Washington University Law Review, Vol. 87, N.º 3, 2010, pp. 505-555. 
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The charitable contribution deduction has regressive features on the donor’s 
side as well. The deduction, just like any other deduction not provided for expenses 
incurred in the production of income, is an upside-down subsidy  (6). The size of 
the subsidy depends on the taxpayer’s marginal tax rate  (7): high-income donors 
receive greater subsidies than low-income donors.
In addition, when contributing an appreciated asset, the built-in gain is exempt 
from capital gains tax and the asset’s fair market value is deducted under 
section 170. This makes the contribution of assets even more tax-favored than 
donating cash, which is regressive because wealthy people have more assets and 
therefore donate more assets than the non-wealthy.
Finally, taxpayers can choose between claiming standard deductions or item-
ized deductions. The higher their income, the more likely taxpayers are to accumu-
late enough itemized deductions to make the total larger than the standard deduc-
tion. The charitable contribution deduction is available only to taxpayers who claim 
itemized deductions on their tax returns. This means, in effect, that when it comes 
to individual donors it is mostly homeowners who profit from the deduction. This 
is because they are the only class of individuals likely to have sufficient deductions 
for other expenditure, primarily home mortgage interest payments and property 
taxes, to justify giving up on the standard deductions.
This, as well as the upside-down structure of this subsidy, is important because 
by deducting the amount donated from their AGI, the donors reduce the taxes they 
pay by the sum they donate multiplied by their marginal tax rate. The taxes that 
they do not pay decrease government revenue available for other projects. The 
deduction is, in effect, a government grant positively correlated with their income 
level. Unlike non-donors, they have the power to affect the allocation of govern-
ment spending according to their own preferences, in addition to whatever influ-
ence they have due to the democratic process.
In this paper, I try to understand what could justify the charitable contribution 
deduction and conduct a normative analysis based on the presumption that the pol-
icymaker’s goal is to maximize social welfare, which is some function of the 
well-being of all members of society. I find that although labeled «charitable,» the 
charitable contribution deduction is mostly justified on efficiency grounds.
In Part A, I discuss two possible justifications for the charitable tax deduction 
as an essential feature of any income tax system: viewing the donation as an 
expense incurred in the production of income; and viewing the donations as 
resources outside the control of the taxpayer, and hence not her income. These two 
justifications have nothing to do with redistribution. They are neutral in that respect.
Part B discusses the justification for the charitable contribution deduction as a 
form of payment for outsourced provision of public goods and redistribution. The 
government intervenes in the market to overcome a market failure known as free-rid-
  (6) A deduction of expenses incurred in generating taxable income is not a subsidy. It is 
required for the tax to function as income tax, not turnover tax. Income tax is imposed on the increase 
in the taxpayer’s ability to consume goods and services. Expenses incurred in the production of income 
must be accounted for, otherwise the taxpayer would be taxed on an illusionary income. For a discus-
sion of the possibility that charitable contributions are expenses incurred to generate income, see Part 
A.1. below. 
  (7) Marginal tax rate is the income tax rate applying to the last dollar of taxable income. 
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ing over public goods. Government intervention is required to finance the public 
goods and redistribution. It can, however, outsource their provision. When the provi-
sion is carried by non-profits, the government may reimburse them through tax sub-
sidies. The charitable contribution deduction benefits the non-profits by lowering 
their capital financing costs. Like the justifications for the charitable contribution 
discussed in Part A, this justification too has nothing to do with redistribution.
Part C discusses two additional efficiency justifications for the charitable con-
tribution deduction: The tax subsidy reveals to the policymaker the unknown pref-
erences of citizens with respect to public goods. In addition, according to public 
choice theory, it creates an avenue for minority groups to receive some government 
funding for their preferred public goods.
Part D discusses the positive emotional sensation, known as «warm glow,» that 
most individuals experience when giving gifts or donating to charitable organiza-
tions. The existence of warm glow would justify the charitable contribution deduc-
tion only if taxpayers derive warm glow not only from their out-of-pocket dona-
tion, but also from the part of the donation that is financed by the tax subsidy.
In Part E, I provide a detailed explanation of the concept of excess burden. I 
then go on to discuss how subsidizing donations may be part of an optimal tax and 
transfer system.
Part F discusses the distributional impact of the charitable contribution deduc-
tion. This section is comprised of three sub-sections. The first sub-section discuss-
es the possible welfare-reducing effects that the deduction might have, due to the 
nature of social status being a zero-sum game. The second sub-section discusses 
the specific structure of the subsidy, namely as a deduction instead of a credit. The 
third sub-section discusses the distributional impact of the outputs of the non-prof-
it organizations. Finally, I conclude.
II.  WHEN A CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION IS REQUIRED 
TO ACCURATELY CALCULATE TAXABLE INCOME
Lump-sum taxes such as a uniform head tax are more efficient than the taxes we 
currently employ, such as income or consumption taxes. This is so because lump-
sum taxes do not affect the taxpayer’s behavior, as each taxpayer’s liability is 
fixed  (8). We do not rely on such taxes because in addition to efficiency, we also 
care about distributive justice. Social policy decisions ought to be based on personal 
attributes –such as the ability to earn– which lump-sum taxes completely ignore.
The ability to earn is one of the relevant attributes that cannot be directly 
observed. Income is thought to be a relatively good proxy for ability. Clearly this is 
not a perfect proxy, because it does not account for effort level. However, by taxing 
income, as a representation of the taxpayer’s ability to consume goods and servic-
es, we believe that we come closer to the ideal tax base.
  (8) We generally do not intend taxes to distort taxpayers’ behavior (the excess burden of taxa-
tion) with the exception of our relatively limited use of taxes (or subsidies) to change taxpayers’ 
behavior in the presence of externalities, causing taxpayers to internalize the social harm (or benefit) 
their behavior involve. 
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The above description of an income tax may justify the deduction of charitable 
contributions, not as a subsidy to promote distributive justice or other goals, but as 
a fundamental element of the system necessary to calculate taxable income, in the 
following two cases:
2.1 THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION AS A BUSINESS EXPENSE
In order for income to represent the taxpayer’s ability to consume, we must 
deduct whatever expenses that are incurred by the taxpayer in order to generate her 
income  (9). These expenses reduce her ability to consume; accordingly, disallow-
ing their deduction would result in overstating the taxpayer’s ability to consume, 
thereby taxing her on an illusionary income.
Charitable contributions are not considered as expenses incurred in the produc-
tion of income. In fact, the IRS has interpreted the phrase «contribution or gift» in 
section 170 as requiring a transfer from the donor to the donee «without adequate 
consideration» in return. This is known as the «quid pro quo» test whereby, in 
order for a contribution to qualify for deduction under section 170, it must occur 
without a direct quid pro quo from the donee in exchange for the putative contribu-
tion.
In reality, however, charitable contributions often have the same effect as 
advertisement and lobbying, expenses incurred in the production of income and 
thus generally allowed as deductibles under IRC section 162. This is clearly the 
case with respect to corporations engaging in corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
a term that includes charitable giving by corporations. Corporations use section 
170 to deduct charitable contributions they have made, but could probably deduct 
much of this under section 162 instead  (10).
Business motives are less obviously present with respect to individuals. But, if 
we consider networking as sometimes serving as a form of business marketing –a 
plausible assumption to make– then charitable contributions by individual donors 
could be regarded a business expense. Making charitable contributions is often a 
necessary prerequisite for becoming a member of the boards of prestigious 
non-profit organizations such as museums or the opera, as well as receiving invita-
tions to galas and other high-profile social events. Such forums are ideal for 
self-promotion and making the useful social connections that may lead to job offers 
or work commissions.
To the extent that networking expenses are recognized as deductible business 
expenses, charitable contributions could qualify as such in certain situations. This 
would be rare in the case of individual donors who, even when networking at char-
ity events and sitting on non-profit boards, are more likely to do so for social status 
  (9) These include the costs of material input; wages, salaries, social security contributions and 
benefits for employees; costs of repairs; depreciation of productive equipment and buildings; advertis-
ing costs; interest paid on borrowed capital used to generate income; and many other miscellaneous 
expenses.
  (10) See Knauer, N. J., «The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of 
the Corporation, and the Social Construction of Charity», DePaul University Law Review, Vol. 44, 
N.º 1, pp. 1-99; Sugin, L., «Encouraging Corporate Charity», Virginia Tax Review, N.º 26, 2006, 
pp. 125-183. 
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and other psychological reasons. However, personal business motives should not 
be ruled out automatically.
To sum up, corporations often deduct their charitable contributions under the 
provisions of section 170; but in fact, in many cases these contributions should 
have been deducted under section 162, as business expenses. To a lesser degree, the 
same is true with individuals, assuming that the networking aspect is significant 
and that the tax system allows for the deduction of expenses incurred whilst solic-
iting work through networking.
The policy meaning of characterizing charitable contributions as a business 
expense, as suggested in this sub-chapter, is that it has to be deducted when com-
puting taxable income. Its effect on taxpayer behavior is neutral. It is not a subsidy, 
and hence does not promote distributive justice or any other policy goal.
2.2  CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS ARE OUTSIDE THE NORMATIVE 
DEFINITION OF «INCOME»
As noted above, income tax should ideally be imposed on annual consumption, 
as well as on the increase in ability to consume of a taxpayer during that year. 
Some influential legal scholars have argued that donations are not consumption, 
and therefore should not be taxed  (11). This view has since been broadly reject-
ed  (12). Indeed, it is difficult to understand how, as a technical matter, the volun-
tary use of one’s own resources would not be considered as consumption  (13). It 
could be interpreted as such under a legal interpretation method that looks to policy 
and reads the law in line with the desired policy, even in cases where technical, 
straightforward interpretation would point in a different direction. However, there 
  (11) Most notably Andrews, W. D., «Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax», Harvard 
Law Review, Vol. 86, N.º 2, 1972, pp. 309-385 («A good argument can be made that taxable personal 
consumption should be defined to include divisible, private goods and services whose consumption by 
one household precludes enjoyment by others, but not collective goods whose enjoyment is non-pre-
clusive or the nonmaterial satisfactions that arise from making contributions.»). See also Bittker, B. 
I., «Charitable Contributions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?», Tax Law Review, No. 28, 1972, 
pp. 37-63 (charitable donations should not be considered consumption because they «discharge moral 
obligation»); Buckles, J. R., «The Community Income Theory of the Charitable Contributions 
Deduction», Indiana Law Journal, N.º 80, 2005, pp. 947-986 (assets donated to charity should more 
properly be considered «community income»). 
  (12) See Galle, B., «The Role of Charity in a Federal System», William and Mary Law 
Review, Vol. 53, No. 3, 2012, pp. 777-851 (noting literature’s rejection of this argument); Colombo, J. 
D., «The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions Deduction: Integrating Theories 
for the Deduction and Tax Exemption», Wake Forest Law Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2001, pp. 657-703 
(same); Perry Fleischer, op. cit., as in note 5, p. 517; Brakman Reiser, D., «Dismembering Civil 
Society: The Social Cost of Internally Undemocratic Nonprofits», Oregon Law Review, N.º 82, 2003, 
pp. 829-900, at pp. 882-83 & n. 199 (same); Pozen, D. E., «Remapping the Charitable Deduction», 
Connecticut Law Review, N.º 39, pp. 531-601, at pp. 552-53 (2006) («In Congress, the courts, the 
media, and now academia, the deduction is widely viewed not as a means to reify the ideal tax base ... 
but as a tax expenditure used to promote charitable giving and thereby the ultimate well-being of soci-
ety. That is, the deduction is widely viewed as a government subsidy ...»).
  (13) But to assume that the benefits of an altruistic act are always at least as great as the costs, 
as in a market transaction, is to disregard some forms of giving such as sacrificial giving or acting out 
of commitment. See Sen, A., «Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic 
Theory», Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 6, N.º 4, 1977, pp. 317-344, at p. 317.
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is no need in this case to force the interpretation of the legal text to achieve the 
policy goal, as we can simply argue that the deduction is an intentional subsidy.
III.  THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION AS A 
GOVERNMENT PAYMENT FOR OUTSOURCED SERVICES
The leading rationale in the literature is that the charitable contribution deduc-
tion is meant to encourage potential donors to finance the activities of charitable 
organizations  (14). This interpretation is also supported by legislative history.
The charitable income tax deduction became part of the Internal Revenue Code 
in 1917, a mere four years after the Sixteenth Amendment made the imposition of 
income tax constitutional. It was enacted as part of a tax bill that raised federal tax 
rates, to help finance the costs of entering World War I  (15).
Excerpts from the floor debate reveal that the original purpose of the charitable 
contribution deduction was to encourage continued philanthropic giving, thought 
to be an efficient alternative to the government’s support of nonprofit organizations 
providing a public benefit. Proponents of the charitable contribution deduction 
thought the deduction was necessary, on policy grounds, to insulate philanthropic 
giving from the high income-tax rates that began to emerge during World War I, 
fearing that otherwise the flow of private philanthropy would dry up  (16).
This motive was again explicitly stated when the provision, initially available 
only to individuals, was amended during the Great Depression to include corporate 
donors  (17).
The charitable organizations that qualify under section 170 are corporation, 
trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation, created or organized in the United 
States and under US law. They are organized and operated exclusively for reli-
gious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national 
or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of their activities 
involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals. These organizations are non-profit. No part of their 
net earnings contribute to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
As we can see, these organizations provide goods and services at a community 
level. The individuals who found and contribute to these organizations receive a tax 
subsidy in the form of a deduction, and the organizations are subsidized by being 
tax-exempt.
  (14) The possibility that charitable contribution, especially when the donor is a corporation, is 
a business expense, has been mostly ignored; and in any case both sections 162 and 170 allow for 
deductions. Thus, the policy implications are limited. But see Sugin, supra note 10. 
  (15) War Revenue Act, ch. 63, § 1201(2), 40 Stat. 300, 330 (1917).
  (16) See Fishman, J. and Schwarz, S., Taxation of Nonprofit Organizations: Cases and Mate-
rials, Foundation Press, Minnesota, 3d ed., 2010, at p. 594; Wallace, J. A. and Fisher, R. W., «The 
Charitable Deduction Under Section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code», in Research Papers Spon-
sored by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, Vol. IV, US Department of the 
Treasury, 1977, pp. 2131-2161. 
  (17) See Colombo, supra note 12, at p. 682 («the federal government sought voluntary trans-
fers from the private sector (i.e., nontax revenue) to fund needed social programs»).
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It is reasonable to presume that there must be a market failure that prevents the 
market from providing the goods or services that these organizations provide. The 
most likely market failure in this context is the non-exclusivity of public goods, 
which results in free-riding. A public good has two characteristics: it is non-ex-
cludable, in that individuals cannot be effectively excluded from using it even if 
they did not participate in financing the good; and it is non-rivalrous, meaning that 
the use by one individual does not reduce availability of the good to others. Nation-
al defense, for example, is a public good. Once supplied, everyone benefits from it.
Charitable organizations often supply healthcare and education. These may be 
made available only to individuals who have paid for the service, but health and 
education nevertheless have an important public good feature: the benefits that 
everyone living in a country enjoys by being part of an educated and healthy popu-
lation. In such conditions, society in general is more pleasant, less dangerous and 
more prosperous, as educated healthy people tend to have a higher level of work 
productivity. The same is true of another service offered by charitable organization: 
support for the poor. Decreasing poverty improves the quality of life of all resi-
dents for the same reasons that providing health and education do.
The existence of market failure explains why the market does not provide the 
goods and services at the desirable level in the absence of government intervention. 
But why does the government provide a tax subsidy to charitable organizations and 
to their donors, rather than solving the market failure by imposing taxes, raising 
revenue and providing the public goods and services either directly or via outsourc-
ing?  (18).
Indeed, the government imposes taxes to finance public goods and to promote 
distributive justice. Such government intervention in the market is required 
because, without coercion, people will tend to avoid participation in the financing 
of public goods and redistribution, seeking instead to free-ride on the contributions 
of others. This does not mean, however, that the government has to provide the 
public goods and redistributive social services itself. It can outsource their provi-
sion to for-profit as well as to non-profit firms.
The government decides what goods and services to outsource and to whom. 
The main consideration is efficiency. The government outsources the provision of 
the goods or services to the organization that would provide the public goods or 
services at the highest ratio of quality to cost. In rare cases, the government pro-
vides the goods and services itself –even when it is not the most efficient provider– 
if privatization is thought to be immoral, or in cases where it is too difficult for the 
government to monitor quality  (19).
Usually the government pays the providers of public goods and services with 
money. However, it may provide them with a tax subsidy instead. The tax subsidy 
minimises the tax obligation of the service provider. The tax revenue forgiven is the 
  (18) Government intervention is required to solve the problem of financing the public goods 
due to free riding. When it comes to provision of the public goods, there is no market failure. Hence, 
the government will provide the goods by itself or outsource their provision based on an assessment of 
comparative advantages only. The public goods will be supplied either by the government, or by 
for-profit or non-profit organizations chosen by the government on the basis of efficiency. 
  (19) For example, the Israel Supreme Court disallowed the privatization of prisons for these 
reasons. 
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government’s payment for the provision of services. The policymaker chooses 
between direct government payments and tax subsidies, selecting the form of pay-
ment that incurs the least cost.
Payment for outsourced services to a non-profit organization can either take 
one of two forms, or a combination of the two: (a) subsidizing charitable contribu-
tion to the non-profit organization; or (b) providing the non-profit organization 
with a direct government grant. The subsidy, as well as the grant, are both financed 
by the government, using revenue collected via the tax system.
Let us assume, for example, that the government wishes to provide private tui-
tion to underprivileged children. It could provide this service through government 
employees, or outsource the provision of the service to for-profit or non-profit 
firms. Assuming it decides to outsource the provision of tutoring, the government 
must decide how to pay the provider for its services. It will do so by comparing the 
cost of a direct grant with the cost of a tax subsidy, choosing the lower cost option.
One form of tax subsidy provided to non-profit organizations is section 170: 
the charitable contribution deduction. It allows donors to deduct their donations, 
thereby lowering the financing cost of non-profit organizations. The tax subsidy 
given to donors lowers the «price» of donation, resulting in greater donations. This 
deduction is, in effect, a government matching-grant given to donors.  (20) The 
non-profit benefits from it, and thus the deduction can be construed as a form of 
government payment for its services.
IV.  PARTIAL FUNDING OF PUBLIC GOODS PREFERRED BY 
MINORITIES AND OF UNKNOWN PREFERENCES
4.1 PUBLIC CHOICE
According to public choice theory, a majority voting system will select the 
outcome most preferred by the median voter. A government will therefore fund and 
provide, either directly or via outsourcing, only the public goods that it believes 
would meet the preferences of the median voter  (21).
Individuals whose preferences differ significantly from those of the median 
voter are, by definition, minorities. They may form coalitions to demand that the 
government fund and supply their preferred public goods. The charitable contribu-
tion deduction can be interpreted as a compromise between a coalition of minori-
ties and the majority.
  (20) Strnad, J., «The Charitable Contributions Deduction: A Politico-Economic Analysis», in 
S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, Oxford University Press, New York, 
1986, pp. 265-296, at p. 273.
  (21) Weisbrod, B. A., «Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Nonprofit Sector in a Three-Sector 
Economy», in S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.), The Economics of Nonprofit Institutions, Oxford University 
Press, New York, pp. 21-44, at pp. 24-2. The public choice literature recognizes that majority votes do 
not always determine political outcomes but uses the majoritarian model for simplicity and as starting 
point for the argument. 
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The government partially funds the public goods preferred by minorities by 
allowing them to deduct from their taxable income the amounts they contribute to 
the preferred charitable organizations that supply their chosen public goods.
The charitable contribution deduction is capped at 50% of AGI in the case of 
individual donors, and 10% for corporate donors. This means that individual donors 
who donate more than 50% of their AGI do not receive any subsidy for the surplus. 
Contributions of appreciated property are capped at 30% of AGI  (22). Carry-for-
wards for unused deductions are allowed, but only with restrictions.
Viewing the charitable contribution deduction as a compromise between the 
majority and the minority coalition over government funding of public goods pro-
vides a possible explanation for this cap on charitable contribution deduction. The 
minorities are allowed to deduct their charitable contributions to their preferred 
public goods, allocating in this way the tax revenue forgone according to their pref-
erences. However, they are still required to pay taxes on at least half of their gross 
income. The revenue from this tax is allocated according to the majority’s prefer-
ences  (23).
4.2 ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION REGARDING PREFERENCES
The government cannot know its citizens’ exact preferences for public goods. 
As it often delegates responsibility to local governments to finance and distribute 
public goods –making the presumption that local governments have superior 
knowledge about the needs of the local residents– similarly the government relies 
on donors to target the government provision of some public goods. Reliance on 
donors may be justified, given that the tax deduction does not fully compensate 
them.
The charitable deduction essentially casts the government as a financing part-
ner, with taxpayer-donors serving as intermediaries or agents who choose the pro-
viders of –or indeed the very existence of– certain services  (24). When residents 
contribute to charitable organizations, they channel tax revenue to their preferred 
charitable organizations, tax revenue that could otherwise be allocated elsewhere 
by the government. In addition, they provide the government with information 
about their preferences for direct government spending. This information consists 
not only of the identity of the charitable organization and the preferred public good, 
but also the intensity of the preference, reflected in the amount they contribute.
The charitable contribution deduction is therefore justified on efficiency 
grounds. It solves the failure of asymmetric information, and makes the whole sys-
  (22) Contributions made to a private foundation which is a charitable organization funded by a 
single individual, a corporate source or a close-knit family group. A private foundation makes grants to 
other charities instead of conducting its own charitable activities. Cash contributions to a private foun-
dation are capped at 30% of AGI, and property contributions are capped at 20%. See Fishman and 
Schwarz, supra note 16, at p. 472.
  (23) See Perry Fleischer, M., «Generous to a Fault? Fair Shares and Charitable Giving», 
Minnesota Law Review, N.º 93, 2008, pp. 165-230.
  (24) Levmore, S., «Taxes as Ballots», University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 65, N.º 2, 
pp. 387-431.
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tem of financing and providing public goods for the satisfaction of the citizens 
more competitive.
V. THE EXISTENCE OF WARM GLOW
Donors are sometimes purely altruistic, caring only about the end-result, which 
is that the goods or services should be supplied. In that case, there is no advantage 
to subsidizing donations over the regular taxation and provision method.
However, more usually, donors derive some personal satisfaction from being in 
the position to finance the provision of the public goods or services through a pro-
cess that allows them to choose those goods or services to be provided, and even 
possibly be involved in their provision by assuming various functions (such as 
being board members) in the charitable organizations.
The good feeling that most donors derive from being the ones to choose the 
charitable organization and being involved in the actual provision of goods is 
termed warm glow  (25). Donors are part of society; hence, the policymaker may 
prefer to provide the public goods by subsidizing donors to create the warm glow, 
thereby increasing overall social welfare  (26).
It is unclear whether a tax subsidy can increase the warm glow derived by 
donors. It depends on the extent to which donors view themselves as donating the 
gross or the net amount. Let us clarify this by using the following simple example.
Assume that a donor, whose marginal tax rate is 35%, donates $100,000 to a 
charitable organization and deducts this donation under section 170. Her out-of-
pocket cost is only $65,000. Does she derive from the donation the same level of 
warm glow as she would have in a world with no section 170, donating $65,000 or 
$100,000?
The subsidy may be justified for increasing social welfare in the form of warm 
glow, but only if she feels as if she donated $100,000, or at least more than $65,000.
VI. REDUCING THE EXCESS BURDEN OF TAXATION
Another reason why the provision of a tax subsidy to charitable organisations 
and their donors –rather than imposing taxation to raise revenue for the provision 
of services, directly or via outsourcing– is that it allows the government to raise 
funds for public goods (and income redistribution) without incurring the excess 
burden of taxation, in part or at all. Excess burden, also known as deadweight loss, 
  (25) The term was coined by Andreoni. See Andreoni, J., «Giving with Impure Altruism: 
Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 97, N.º 6, 
1989, pp. 1447-1458; Andreoni, J., «Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of 
Warm-Glow Giving», The Economic Journal, 1990, pp. 464-477.
  (26) There are arguments against including warm glow in social welfare. See discussion 
below. 
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is the inefficiency of the tax system, namely, the loss of welfare above and beyond 
the tax revenues collected.
Because not all readers are familiar with tax policy, I will briefly provide the 
basic background necessary to understand the argument, and then connect it to our 
discussion of tax incentives offered to donors.
As mentioned above, the government is supposed to correct market failures 
and promote distributive justice using tax and regulation. Taxes that correct market 
failures such as externalities –say, a tax on pollution– are efficient.
Once market failures are corrected and the market becomes competitive, indi-
viduals and firms are thought to be the best judges of the goods and services they 
value. Accordingly, they make spending decisions to maximize their well-being 
and in line with their own preferences. The result, as Adam Smith observed over 
two hundred years ago, is known as the invisible hand of the market, and is assumed 
to maximize social efficiency.
The use of taxes other than Pigovian taxes –namely, other than taxes that cor-
rect externalities– interferes with this efficiency, because the taxes induce firms 
and individuals to shun taxed activities in favor of relatively untaxed ones, keeping 
us from making the best use of our resources.
In other words, it is a net welfare loss, caused by reducing the welfare of tax-
payers by taxing them, without generating revenue that could be used to enhance 
welfare through government actions such as the provision of public goods or redis-
tribution.
A significant part of the inefficiency cost of taxation derives from administra-
tive costs such as compliance and enforcement. Empirical research estimates these 
costs to be about 20%, meaning that in order to finance one dollar of transfer pay-
ment to promote distributive justice, the government needs to raise in tax not just 
one dollar but one dollar and twenty cents  (27).
Some inefficiency is caused by tax avoidance activity, because taxpayers 
engage in transactions that are not optimal from a business perspective, and which 
therefore do not generate the highest possible yield. These transactions include tax 
evasion, which is illegal, as well as tax planning, which is legal. Both can involve 
huge transaction costs, such as the incorporation of a company abroad, the use of 
shell companies, etc. It may also include relatively small and legitimate actions, 
which because many millions of people also engage in these actions amount to 
significant aggregate sums at the national level.
This is a cost to society, since the production factors are not being optimally 
used to produce the maximum yield. The people who work in facilitating tax plan-
ning or evasion, such as lawyers and accountants, as well as those who work on the 
government side to enforce the taxes, do not create any added value to society. 
They do not increase the standard of living. They merely engage in the distribution 
of income generated by others within the society. Ultimately, they pull in opposite 
directions.
  (27) Slemrod, J. and Bakija, J., Taxing Ourselves, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 2004, at. pp. 
158-161. It is important to note that soliciting donations for non-profits is also wasteful. It is an open 
empirical question whether charitable fundraising costs are lower than tax compliance and administra-
tive costs. 
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But the term excess burden is often used to describe one specific cost of taxa-
tion: the effect that taxes have on relative prices.
It would be easier to explain using an example. American examples often 
involve the neighbor’s teenager coming over to babysit, or to mow our backyard 
lawn, or to shovel snow from our front yard.
Let us imagine babysitting.
You want to go out for 5 hours to, say, a movie and dinner. You have a baby, 
and your neighbor’s teenage daughter is willing to babysit.
Her reservation price is $15 an hour. By reservation price (also known as the 
opportunity cost of her time), we mean what her leisure time is worth to her, assum-
ing that leisure is her alternative to taking the babysitting job.
Let us assume this is the competitive price, at least in the area you are living in. 
Namely, this is what babysitters charge per hour. You would not find a less expen-
sive option.
You are happy to pay $20 per hour. Hence, both of you would benefit from a 
transaction at a price that is anywhere between $15 and $20 per hour.
As we have assumed 5 hours of work, there is a social surplus generated by this 
voluntary transaction of 5 X $5 = $25.
If the transaction were set at $20 per hour, then the entire surplus of $25 would 
go to the babysitter.
If the transaction were set at $15 per hour than the entire surplus of $25 would 
go to you.
Suppose now that there is a 26% income tax. You are willing to pay up to $20 
per hour, but the potential babysitter will not take the job unless she receives $15 
per hour, which is more than the $14.80 that will be her after-tax income if you pay 
her $20  (28).
So, assuming she does not evade taxes, you will not go out to see a movie and 
she will stay at home and will not benefit from having some extra cash.
Please note that no one in this example has benefited from this tax. Both partic-
ipants in the aborted transaction lost an opportunity to increase personal happiness, 
but because no tax was paid, no one benefited from any use of tax revenue.
The loss to society is the social surplus that was not created. Assuming, in our 
example of 5 hours of work, that this would have been 5 X $5 = $25. $5 per hour, 
being the difference between the babysitter’s reservation price of $15, and what 
you were willing to pay, $20 per hour.
More often, a transaction does take place, but due to the tax-induced increase 
in prices, a smaller quantity is purchased; some potential social surplus will none-
theless be lost.
Now, let us move on to the topic of this paper –tax incentives provided to 
donors– and examine the excess burden the incentive saves or involves.
One important aspect of financing public goods and redistribution through 
donations is that unlike taxes, donations are voluntary. The easiest way to under-
stand the argument I am about to present would be to view charitable contribution 
as consumption good with positive externalities  (29). Donors purchase a warm 
  (28) $20 X (1-0.26) = $14.80.
  (29) For such modeling, see Saez, E., «The Optimal Treatment of Tax Expenditures», Journal 
of Public Economics, N.º 88, 2004, pp. 2657-2684. 
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feeling, derived from doing a good deed; social status and prestige; political power; 
or even the belief that they have secured a place in heaven.
When donations fund public goods and promote distributive justice, they 
improve the overall efficiency of the system by replacing taxes that involve excess 
burden. The problem, however, is that donations confer positive externalities and 
therefore are undersupplied. This is obviously true when financing public goods, 
but it is even so when the donation is a gift to one recipient.
Let us look at the following simple example. An individual will donate up to 
the point at which the marginal benefit to the individual just equals the marginal 
cost. A donation that costs the donor $1, makes the donor happier by more than $1. 
She will continue to make such donations until the marginal benefit she derives 
from donating $1 is lower than $1. Let us assume for example that the benefit to 
her from donating $1 is only $0.75. In that case, she does not make the donation. 
From a social point of view, this is inefficient if the recipient derives a benefit 
greater than $0.25. Let us assume that the benefit derived by the recipient is $1. In 
that case, donating $1 increases social welfare by $1.75  (30).
As in most market transactions, the price will have an effect on the quantity 
demanded. The charitable contribution deduction effectively reduces the price of 
the charitable contributions relative to non-deductible consumption to one minus 
the marginal income tax rate for those who claim them  (31).
Assuming for ease of calculation, that the donor’s marginal tax rate in our 
example is 50%. Deducting her charitable contribution reduces the out-of-pocket 
cost of the donation from $1 to $0.50. This motivates the donor to make the dona-
tion because it costs her $0.50, whereas the benefit she derives in our example is 
$0.75. From a social point of view, this is efficient, because at a total cost of $1, a 
total benefit of $1.75 was derived. For this reason, efficiency requires the subsidi-
zation of all gifts and bequests, even if no public goods are being financed  (32).
Charitable contribution to non-profits usually provides positive external bene-
fits to others besides the direct recipients. For example, a donation that finances 
private tutoring to underprivileged children helps not only them but also society in 
general, as living in a more equal society improves the overall good feeling of suc-
cess and harmony. In particular, these children will later become more productive 
workers and contribute to society through products or services, as well as increase 
taxation revenue.
The effect of the charitable contribution deduction depends on its price elastic-
ity that is the percentage change in donations caused by a 1% change in price. 
Allowing taxpayers to deduct their charitable contributions decreases tax revenue, 
but increases donation.
Let us assume that donations finance the provision of public goods and servic-
es, of similar value, that advance the maximization of the social welfare function of 
government. If we also assume that the government would otherwise fund such 
  (30) Bakija, J., «Tax Policy and Philanthropy: A Primer on the Empirical Evidence for the 
United State and Its Implications», Social Research, Vol. 80, N.º 2, 2013, pp. 557-584, at p. 577.
  (31) The tax exemption of non-profit organizations, a topic outside the scope of this paper, has 
similar effects. 
  (32) See Kaplow, L., «A Note on Subsidizing Gifts», Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 58, 
N.º 3, 1995, pp. 469-477.
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goods and services with tax revenue, then the policymakers’ goal should be to 
induce the most donations possible, for a given cost in terms of tax revenues for-
gone.
To do so, the policymaker must know the price elasticity of charitable contribu-
tions. It also needs to assess the administrative and compliance costs of the tax 
system, as well as the fundraising costs of the non-profit organizations. Moreover, 
to evaluate the total effect on social welfare, the dollar-valued benefits from a 
donation to the donors (the warm glow), the direct recipients, and others should all 
be weighted by the marginal social welfare weights of each involved person. For 
example, under a utilitarian social welfare function, the value of a $1 benefit to a 
high-income donor or recipient would be lower than the value of the $1 benefit to a 
low-income donor or recipient.
The literature on optimal taxation takes all the above considerations into 
account and suggests the optimal subsidy structure and tax rate  (33). I will not go 
into the detail of the optimal tax models, but will offer one, mainly unintuitive, 
policy insight, explaining it non-formally with a numerical example.
When the price elasticity of donations is 1 or greater (in absolute value), $1 of 
tax revenue is forgone due to allowing the taxpayers to deduct their charitable con-
tributions from their taxable incomes, resulting in a donation of more than $1. In 
such a case, it is intuitive to think that the charitable tax deduction is warranted. 
Because, assuming the donation funds public good and redistribution similar to 
what the government provides, the charitable contribution deduction increases the 
funding while keeping the level of excess burden constant, or lowers the excess 
burden while keeping the level of funding constant.
It is, however, less intuitive to understand why even when the price elasticity of 
donations is lower than 1 (in absolute value), the charitable contribution deduction 
may be desirable from a social policy perspective.
I will try to explain this using the following example. Suppose that the margin-
al tax rate of a donor is 35%, and that without a tax deduction she would donate 
$100. Let us assume now that if she is allowed to deduct the charitable contribution 
from her taxable income she would donate $154 or more. This means that when the 
elasticity is 1 or greater (in absolute value) no tax revenue in our example is for-
gone  (34).
Further assume that the elasticity is lower than 1 (in absolute value), but that 
the public good in our example is funded only by donors at a level that the policy-
maker views to be too low. Let us assume it is currently funded at $100 billion, but 
that the government would like it to be $130 billion. The problem, however, is that 
when the government uses tax revenue to increase the total funding for this particu-
lar public good, the donors reduce their contributions by the same amount. This 
phenomenon is known as «crowding out,» which is the change in private donations 
caused by a $1 increase in government spending  (35).
  (33) See, e.g., Saez, supra note 29; Diamond, P., «Optimal Tax Treatment of Private Contri-
butions for Public Goods With and Without Warm Glow Preferences», Journal of Public Economics, 
Vol. 90, N.º 4-5, 2006, pp. 897-919.
  (34) $154 x (1- 0.35) = $100
  (35) See Roberts, R. D., «Financing Public Goods», Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 95, 
N.º 2, 1987, pp. 420-437; Andreoni, supra note 25. 
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Assuming donors decrease their donation by $1 for each $1 the government 
contributes, it would cost the government $130 billion to bring the level of the pub-
lic good to the desired level.
Instead, the government may offer the donors a tax incentive. Let us assume it is 
a tax deduction, and let us further assume that the donors’ marginal tax rate is 35%. 
Let us also assume that the price elasticity of contribution is lower than 1 (in absolute 
value), so that the donors do not increase their donations by $154 billion or more. Let 
us assume they increase it only to $130 billion, satisfying the government goal.
In that case, offering the tax deduction reduced the out-of-pocket donation 
from $100 billion –which was the amount donors contributed with no tax deduc-
tion– to only $84.5 billion  (36). However in the presence of crowding out, it allows 
the government to reach the $130 billion goal with an investment of $45.5 instead 
of $130 billion, saving it $84.5 billion  (37).
To sum up, the charitable contribution deduction may increase social welfare. 
Its optimal structure and rate depend on: (a) the price elasticity of contribution; (b) 
the dollar-valued benefits from a donation to the donors, to the direct recipients, and 
to others, weighted by the marginal social welfare weights of each involved person, 
under our choice of a social welfare function; and (c) the level of crowding out.
VII. DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
The optimal tax model described above considers the distributional impact, as 
maximizing social welfare requires finding the optimal balancing of efficiency and 
equity considerations. The previous chapter, however, elaborated on the efficiency 
aspect of the charitable contribution deduction, as most of the chapter was devoted 
to explaining and discussing the issue of elasticity. This chapter will focus on the 
equity consideration.
It is important to distinguish between: (a) the distributive implications of using 
the mechanism of donations to finance the public goods; (b) the design of tax sub-
sidy (Why not replace the deduction with a credit? Why not offer the tax subsidy to 
all donors, namely, for any private provision of public goods, instead of limiting it 
to those who itemize their deductions?); and (c) the profile of people who donate, 
distinguished by income class; how progressive is the distribution of the outputs of 
non-profit organizations?
7.1  THE DISTRIBUTIVE IMPLICATIONS OF USING THE MECHANISM 
OF DONATIONS TO FINANCE PUBLIC GOODS
The warm glow effect discussed above obviously increases social welfare 
when we look only at its positive effects on donors. However, some of the good 
feeling experienced by donors is from the increase in their social status. Such an 
  (36) 130 x (1- 0.35) = $84.5
  (37) 130 x 0.35 = $45.5
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increase may create a negative externality on others, and be regarded as rent-seek-
ing, as social status is a zero sum game  (38).
This would decrease social welfare. Thus, the social desirability of providing 
the public good by the mechanism of subsidizing donation depends on the outcome 
of the trade-off between the increase in well-being of the donors due to the warm 
glow on the one side, and the decreased well-being of others on the other side. 
Donors, too, may be adversely affected by donations of other donors, as it reduces 
their own social status.
The negative externality created by donations, due to the zero-sum game nature 
of social status, reduces social welfare. It should therefore be taken into account 
when designing the optimal tax structure and rate of the tax incentive offered to 
donors. It could even lead to the conclusion that donations should be taxed.
There are reasons not to include warm glow in the social welfare perspective. 
People may donate due to unpleasant pressure imposed on them. In such circum-
stances, the warm glow does not describe an increase in social welfare but merely 
a decrease in disutility coming from the pressure to donate  (39). Moreover, the 
analysis of warm glow may be too incomplete to allow basing policy recommenda-
tions on it. Warm glow is an evaluation based on the process of determining the 
final resource allocation. If we only track some uses and ignore others, the policy 
implications may be distorted. If we cannot account for all of the uses of resources, 
we may be better off not accounting for any of them, including the warm glow, at 
all  (40).
In addition, it is very difficult to measure warm glow because of behavioral 
biases. Experiments find that people react differently to seemingly equivalent sub-
sidy-schemes  (41).
Finally, the policymaker may need to account for the following additional 
argument: relying on donors to finance public goods severs the link between pro-
cesses of decision-making and the citizens these decisions are intended to benefit, 
and therefore erodes political engagement and its underlying notion of shared 
  (38) See Frank, R. H., Choosing the Right Pond: Human Behavior and the Quest for Status, 
Oxford University Press, New York (1985); Frank, R. H., «Frames of Reference and the Quality of 
Life», American Economic Review, Vol. 79, N.º 2, 1989, pp. 80-85; Frank, R. H., «Positional Exter-
nalities», in R. J. Zeckhauser (ed.), Strategy and Choice, MIT Press, Cambridge (MA), 1991, pp. 
25-47; McAdams, R. H., «Relative Preferences», Yale Law Journal, N.º 102, 1992, pp. 1-104; Blum-
kin, T. and Sadka, E., «A Case for Taxing Charitable Donations», Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 
91, N.º 7-8, 2007, pp. 1555-1564. 
  (39) See Diamond, supra note 33, at pp. 909, 917; Andreoni, J., «Philanthropy», in S. Kolm 
and J. M. Ythier (eds.), Handbook of the Economics of Giving, Altruism and Reciprocity, North-Hol-
land, Amsterdam, 2006, pp. 1201-269, at p. 1225; but see Schizer, D. M., Subsidizing Charitable 
Contributions: Incentives, Information, and the Private Pursuit of Public Goals, Tax Law Review, 
N.º 62, 2009, pp. 221-269, at p. 226 (arguing that it is a matter of context. People donate under pres-
sure only in unusual settings, because usually there are painless ways to refuse a solicitation… «Obvi-
ously, many donors derive great joy from their donation, and this satisfaction should not be dismissed 
as irrelevant.»). 
  (40) See Diamond, supra note 33, at p. 916. 
  (41) See, e.g., Eckel, C. and Grossman, P., «Rebate Versus Matching: Does how we Subsidize 
Charitable Contributions Matter?», Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 87, N.º 3-4, 2003, pp. 681-701 
(finding that total contributions were 1.2-2 times greater with a match than a rebate, and were more 
responsive to changes in the match than they were to changes in the rebate). 
EXPLORING THE RATIONALE FOR THE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTION DEDUCTION
 AFDUAM 20 (2016) 152
responsibility  (42). This is so even if everyone wants the public good to be financed 
by donations rather than taxes. This is because when the public good is financed by 
donations, the citizens are giving up some political engagement and responsibility 
that some scholars do not believe they should be allowed to surrender  (43).
7.2 THE DESIGN OF THE TAX SUBSIDY FOR DONATIONS
As mentioned in the Introduction, the charitable deduction is more valuable to 
high-income taxpayers than to low-income taxpayers because of the increasing mar-
ginal tax rates structure. This makes it cheaper for high-bracket taxpayers to donate.
Replacing the deduction with a tax credit, namely reducing tax liability dollar 
for dollar taking into account amounts given to charity, would equalize the after tax 
price of donation to low and high income taxpayers.
A credit would also allow the government to choose the credit rate that would 
maximize donations, whereas in setting the marginal tax rates the policymaker is 
mostly concerned with the willingness of taxpayers to work and save, not their 
willingness to give to charity  (44).
However, if the price elasticity of giving is greater than 1 (in absolute value), it 
may be that the deduction amplifies the redistributive effect of the tax by encourag-
ing the wealthy to devote more dollars to charities that benefit the poor than wealthy 
donors save in taxes  (45).
Moreover, if high-income individuals have larger price elasticity for contribu-
tions than low-income individuals, offering high-income individuals a greater sub-
sidy– as a deduction does– would increase overall contributions  (46).
It therefore seems likely that a credit is better, but empirical findings regarding 
elasticity of donation may justify a deduction.
7.3  THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE OUTPUTS OF NON-PROFIT 
ORGANIZATIONS
Much has been written about the distributive allocation of charitable contribu-
tions  (47). As a percentage of annual income, deductible contributions make a 
  (42) Dorfman, A. and Harel, A., «Against Privatization as Such», (Jan. 2015) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
  (43) The argument is presented in the text de-ontologically. It could be «translated» to wel-
farism to better fit the rest of this paper, by plausibly assuming that social welfare is increased when 
citizens are politically engaged and that they derive utility from having responsibility over the choice 
and quality of their public goods and can influence the way the public goods are managed. See also 
Diamond, supra note 33, at 909 («Perhaps there is resentment at the need to provide privately what is 
seen as a government obligation.»). 
  (44) See Schizer, supra note 39, at p. 238. 
  (45) See Brannon, G., «Tax Expenditures and Income Distribution: A Theoretical Analysis of 
the Upside-Down Subsidy Argument», in H. Aaron and M. Boskin (eds.), The Economics of Taxation, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 1980, pp. 87-98, at. pp. 92-95. 
  (46) See Strand, supra note 20, at p. 276. 
  (47) See, e.g., Auten, G. E., Clotfelter, C. T. and Schmalbeck, R. L., «Taxes and Philan-
thropy among the Wealthy», in J. Slemrod (ed.), Does Atlanta Shrug? The Economic Consequences of 
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U-shape pattern. Low-income taxpayers contribute a relatively high percentage of 
their AGI. Donations as a percentage of AGI fall as AGI increases. When AGI 
reaches annual income of around $500,000 (in 2009) donations as a percentage of 
income start to increase  (48). The very rich contribute about the same percentage 
of their income as low-income taxpayers. Because there are many more low-in-
come taxpayers than very rich ones, much more donations, in dollar terms, are 
made by low-income taxpayers. Most of the contributions, in dollar terms, come 
from middle-income taxpayers.
The types of organizations favored by donors differ systematically according 
to their incomes. For individuals of modest means, religious organizations are far 
and away the most favored type of donee. Middle-income taxpayers donate mostly 
to religious organizations as well as to education. High-income taxpayers donate to 
higher education, health, religion and the arts  (49).
Only about 7.5% of all donations go towards the satisfaction of basic needs, 
that is, towards relieving poverty  (50). Empirical studies find diversity within the 
non-profit sector, with no overarching distributional impact  (51). In no sub-sector 
of the non-profit sector is there evidence that benefits are dramatically skewed 
towards the rich or the poor.
Even in the sectors in which one might think that for-profits would have a redistrib-
utive effect, such as education  (52) and healthcare  (53), it appears that government-fund-
ed schools and hospitals are much more favorable to the poor and the uninsured than 
the non-profits. When it comes to hospitals, even for-profit hospitals are often more 
generous to the poor than the non-profit hospitals  (54). In areas such as employment, 
training and income support, legal rights and advocacy, there is a strong positive corre-
lation between reliance on government funding and servicing the poor  (55).
To sum up, empirical studies support Vickrey’s hypothesis that «the role of 
philanthropy in redistribution is relatively slight»  (56).
Taxing the Rich, New York and Cambridge (MA), Russell Sage Foundation and Harvard University 
Press, pp. 392-424; Auten, G. E., Sieg, H. and Clotfelter, C. T., «Charitable Giving, Income and 
Taxes: An Analysis of Panel Data», American Economic Review, Vol. 92, N.º 1, 2002, pp. 371-382, at 
p. 371; Clotfelter, C. T., «The Economics of Giving», in J. W. Barry and B. V.Manno (eds.), Giving 
better, giving smarter: working papers of the National Commission on Philanthropy and Civic Renew-
al, National Commission on Philanthropy and Civic Renewal, Washington (DC), 1997, pp. 31-55. 
  (48) Clotfelter, C. T., «Charitable Giving and Tax Policy in the U.S.», in G. Fack and C. 
Landais (eds.), Charitable Giving and Tax Policy: A Historical and Comparative Perspective, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2014, pp. 34-63. 
  (49) Id. 
  (50) Id.
  (51) Clotfelter, C. T., «The Distributional Consequences of Nonprofit Activities», in C. T. 
Clotfelter (ed.), Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?, Chicago University Press, Chicago and Lon-
don, 1992, pp. 1-24.
  (52) See, e.g., Schwartz S. and Baum, S., «Education», in Who Benefits from the Nonprofit 
Sector?, supra note 48, pp. 55-92.
  (53) See, e.g., Salkever, D. S. and Frank, R. G., «Health Services», in Who Benefits from the 
Nonprofit Sector?, supra note 48, pp. 24-55.
  (54) Stern, K., With Charity for All, New York, Doubleday, 2013.
  (55) Salamon, L. M., «Social Services», in Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?, supra 
note 48, pp. 134-174.
  (56) Vickrey, W., «One Economist’s View of Philanthropy», in Frank Dickenson (ed.), Philan-
thropy and Public Policy, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, pp. 31-56.
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Does it matter? Perhaps not. As detailed in the first parts of this paper, the char-
itable contribution deduction, or any other subsidy provided to the non-profit sec-
tor, can be justified on efficiency grounds. The non-profit sector provides plural-
ism; brings individuals’ preferences over public goods to the government’s 
attention; and the tax subsidy manipulates donors to contribute even more than 
they would have otherwise contribute  (57).
One could focus on the efficiency role of the tax preference alone. To the extent 
it reduces the excess burden of tax and increases the provision of public goods, the 
tax-and-transfer system viewed as a whole becomes more progressive, namely, 
redistribution takes place. That is so, because we plausibly assume no correlation 
between individual’s income and the benefit she derives from public goods. High 
and low income individuals may tend to benefit from different public goods, but 
benefit equally from public goods on the aggregate level.
Assuming that donations fund public goods at, or below, the socially optimal 
level, donations free-up the tax revenue that would have been otherwise required to 
finance those public goods. Hence, the money that would have been required to 
finance those public goods, minus the forgone tax revenue due to the tax subsidy, 
can be used for redistribution purposes. Money has no earmarks.
This is similar to the idea that legal rules should be as efficient as possible and 
allow the trade-off between efficiency and equity to take place at a higher level, 
striking a balance between efficient legal rules and the tax and transfer system  (58).
Adopting this view does not relieve us from the need to assess the distributional 
effects of donations. However, this is done not to necessarily change the structure of 
incentives to make the non-profits more redistributive, but in order to adjust the level 
of redistribution carried through the tax-and-transfer system to offset whatever 
impact (regressive or progressive) donations have on overall redistribution in society.
This adjustment is required to bring the overall level of redistribution to the 
level that is thought to maximize our social welfare function.
One could raise an objection to the above argument by pointing out that this 
does not happen when the charitable contribution deduction is justified by plural-
ism, or on asymmetric information grounds: If the donors finance public goods that 
the government would not have otherwise funded, then no tax revenues are being 
freed-up for redistribution purposes.
I think this objection can be answered as follows. Assuming that the government 
should increase taxes and finance those public goods as well, that is, the government 
would have done so in the first place had it known the preferences of the individuals, 
then the private funding allows the government to increase taxes to the level they 
should have been and use the additional tax revenue for redistribution purposes.
To sum up. The non-profit sector does not have a significant re-distributional 
impact. This may call for a change in the incentives given to the organizations, as 
well as to the donors that finance them. To the extent that changing the incentives 
would decrease the efficiency of the non-profit sector in terms of pluralism, infor-
  (57) I use the word «manipulate» because at least some of the subsidy’s effect on donors has to 
do with cognitive biases. 
  (58) See Kaplow, L. and Shavell, S., «Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the 
Income Tax in Redistributing Income», Journal of Legal Studies, N.º 23, 1994, pp. 667-683.
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mation and decreased excess burden  (59), it is possible that redistribution should 
be left to the tax and transfer system.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I have examined the possible justifications for the charitable con-
tribution deduction and found that, in spite of its name, it serves an efficiency role. 
It may also enhance democracy, by forcing the majority to spend some tax revenue 
on public goods that satisfy minorities’ preferences. However, by freeing up some 
tax revenue that would have been otherwise required to finance some public goods, 
it increases social well-being by reducing distortive taxes, or by allowing, at the 
same level of taxes, additional provision of public goods or transfer (welfare) pay-
ments. Public goods are equivalent to universal transfer payments in-kind. Hence, 
even though the charitable contribution deduction has a regressive effect on the tax 
structure, and the tax-exempt entities it finances have a neutral effect on inequality, 
the deduction may have an overall positive redistributive effect.
There is no reason to think that the charitable contribution deduction is optimal. 
Switching to a tax credit is intuitively compelling, calling for empirical studies of 
elasticity to assess the intuition’s validity. The same is true with respect to providing 
differential incentives for contribution based on the tax-exempt organizations’ 
impact on redistribution. This calls for empirical studies that would measure the 
additional administrative costs of introducing differential incentives, and requires a 
cost-benefit analysis to see whether the outcome is indeed welfare enhancing.
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